

PLANT ENGINEERING


LIFE OF PLANT PLAN

CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS

KBA 0022 N NEPO LOPP 164


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
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Date: 2024-02-15

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1 PLANT STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS

The containment buildings at KNPS are a set of 2 units, comprising of the external walls and dome. It is referred to as the 'Third Barrier' in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR §III 3.4). The Nuclear Installation License NIL-01 stipulates the requirement to perform inspections and tests on the Containment Structures applies to the post tensioned, reinforced concrete structure itself, as referred to the 'Third Barrier' in Safety Analysis Report (SAR §III 3.4).

Furthermore, both units house the monitoring or EAU system, as described in section 1.5, monitoring the long-term deformation of the containment structures ensuring that the buildings remain within the design parameters specified for the force in the post-tensioning cables. The results are trended, as per Section 4.5, to ensure that the structures' functions as initially intended.

1.1 Scope

This Life Of Plant Plan (LOPP) addresses the preventative maintenance, testing and inspection regimes, and life cycle plans for the Containment Buildings (1/2 HRX 00 BG) at KNPS.

The Containment Building is also referred to as 'The Third Barrier' in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR §III 3.4). Its function is:

- Sheltering the primary systems from an aggressive environment (rain, wind, wind-carried sand, salt spray) and external missiles,
- Ensuring satisfactory biological radiation protection by acting as a barrier to the spread of radioactive materials to the environment in case of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
- 1/2HRX are also classified as 'pressure vessels' and hence, fall under the jurisdiction of the plant appointed GMR 2.1 as specified in the PER of the OH&S Act. 1994

This LOPP only considers the external containment wall & dome and part of the upper raft and base mat within the containment circumference. The internal concrete structures of the containment building are also included.

The Containment structures at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station (KNPS) were originally licensed for 40-years' service life. Eskom is in the process of extending the operational life of the station for an additional 20 years. Therefore, a service life of 60 years is considered in this LOPP.

1.2 Containment Description

The Containment buildings are founded [22] on the Aseismic Island which comprises the upper and lower rafts separated by aseismic bearings.

A cross-section illustration of Containment is shown in Figure 1, and a summary of the illustrated components' dimensions are provided in Table 1.




Figure 1: Cross-section illustration of a Koeberg Containment Building

Table 1: Summary of Containment Structural Elements' geometrical dimensions

| Element | Geometric Description | Dimension | Level |
|------------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Upper Raft | Thickness | 5.5m | -10m – -4.5m |
| Gusset | Thickness | 1.2m – 0.9m | -4.5m to -0.5m |
| Cylindrical Wall | Internal Diameter | 38.6m | -4.5m to 44.83m |
| | Thickness | 0.9m | |

| Element | Geometric Description | Dimension | Level |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| | Height | 45.33m | |
| Ring Beam | Thickness | Varies (0.9m to 3.3m) | 44.83m to 51.4m |
| | Radius of Beam Chamfer | 6m | |
| Dome | Spherical Radius | 24m | 56.68m |
| | Thickness | 0.8m | |

There are other SSC (Structures, Systems and Components) forming part of the containment structure, which are excluded from this LOPP. These include:

- The Steel Liner,
- Openings and penetrations,
- Biological Doors,
- Gentries and Cranes,
- Equipment on the Dome,
- Other non-structural equipment.

1.2.1 Upper Raft

The containment raft foundation is a part of the upper raft of the Aseismic Island. Its geometric characteristics are as follows:

- the 3 m thick upper raft extends over the complete aseismic island and is the foundation for both reactor buildings,
- the level at the top of the 3 m thick upper raft adjacent to the reactor building is -7.00 m below terrace level,
- the thickness of the upper raft is increased to 5.5 m below the reactor building,
- at the centre of the reactor building a 8.80 m diameter by 0.60 m high shear key is provided to transfer all horizontal forces from the internal structure to the upper raft in the event of an earthquake,
- the level at the top of the shear key in the centre of the reactor building is -3.90m below terrace level

1.2.2 Base Mat

The loads from the internal structures of containment are distributed via the 1.00 m thick reinforced concrete slab called the base mat to the upper raft. The concrete base mat provides space for channels and sumps; it also provides protection to the liner. The base mat is separated from the liner by a sliding membrane on the concrete screed, which is placed on top of the liner to protect the weld

control channels.

1.2.3 Gusset

The gusset connects the cylinder wall to the upper raft.

1.2.4 Cylindrical Wall

The cylindrical wall of containment is a 900mm thick reinforced concrete structure, with an outer diameter of 38.6m. The wall is post-tensioned, vertically and horizontally, with each cable consisting of nineteen 15.2mm strands.

There are 216 vertical cables placed on the 19.13m radii with spacings of 550mm, which extend along the shell circumference from the Aseismic Vault, through the Upper Raft and Gusset to the top of the Ring Beam. The trumpets for each post tensioned cable are embedded in the upper raft at the bottom, and in the ring beam at the top.

There are 255 three quarter turn hoops which have the trumpets anchored in the vertical ribs. The cables are placed in two layers which are on cylindrical radii of 19.03 m and 19.23 m.

The post-tensioned cables were placed in ducts, and the ducts were grouted after the cables were tensioned.

NOTE: All ducts are grouted, except for 4 vertical post tensioned cables on Unit 1 (1HRX). Refer to section 1.5.4.

1.2.5 Ring Beam

The ring beam connects the cylindrical wall with the containment dome, and houses the vertical post-tensioning's trumpets

1.2.6 Dome

The Spherical dome is reinforced concrete and contains post-tensioning which ensures that the entire containment structure can act as a pressure vessel. There are 162 cables grouped into three families having 60° angles between them.

1.3 Internal Structures

The internal structures of containment are included in this LOPP and are included in the relevant sub-sections of this document.

1.3.1 Internal Concrete Structures


Internal concrete structures are the reinforced concrete walls, floors and columns inside the HRX structures used for SSC supports, shielding and conventional dividing.

The structures are divided internally into different levels and rooms.

| Level | GMSL Reference Height | Room Numbers 1HRX/2HRX |
|---------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| Level 1 | -3.40m | R1 <i>x</i> Z /R1 <i>y</i> Z |
| Level 2 | +0.00m | R2 <i>x</i> Z /R2 <i>y</i> Z |
| Level 3 | +5.00m | R3 <i>x</i> Z /R3 <i>y</i> Z |
| Level 4 | +8.00m | R4 <i>x</i> Z /R4 <i>y</i> Z |
| Level 5 | +10.40m | R5 <i>x</i> Z /R5 <i>y</i> Z |
| Level 6 | +15.00m | R6 <i>x</i> Z /R6 <i>y</i> Z |
| Level 7 | +20.00m | R7 <i>x</i> Z /R7 <i>y</i> Z |

R refers to the Reactor Building, *x* = 1-4 and *y* = 5-8 corresponding, i.e. 1 corresponds to 5 and 2 to 6 etc. and Z is a number assigned to the room, as illustrated below:

REACTOR VESSEL ROOM



1.3.2 Radiological Shields

1.3.2.1 Primary Shield

The primary shield is a reinforced concrete cylinder with an internal diameter of 5.20 m, and is situated between the -3.50 m and +20.00 m levels and supported by the upper raft. The wall thickness of the reactor pit (primary shield) varies between 1.80 to 2.10 m.

The primary shield supports the reactor vessel and withstands the pressures and forces in the event of a break in either a primary or secondary circuit pipe.

The shield protects the adjacent systems of the NSSS (primary circuits, heat exchangers, etc.) from excessive radiation during normal operation and provides biological protection from neutron dose of reactor core. Heat generated by the reactor is removed in the interface between the reactor and the

primary shield by a dedicated ventilation system (EVC [13]).

1.3.2.2 Secondary Shield

The secondary shield is an internal cylindrical barrel, which has an external radius of 15.50 m.

The secondary shield consists of walls and floor slabs which, with the primary shield forms bunkers enclosing all major systems and equipment of the primary circuit, i.e. the pressuriser, three safety injection accumulators, reactor coolant pumps, reactor piping and three steam generators. The external wall of the reactor cavity is also part of the secondary shield.

1.3.3 Missile Shields

Missile shields are removable reinforced concrete slabs which are placed over the reactor cavity during operation. The shields protect against potential missiles generated by the hypothetical ejection of a control rod.

1.3.4 Steel Structures

There are numerous internal steel structures inside the containment structures. These structures have various functions, and some are discussed in Section 3.

1.4 Access Doors (Air Locks and Penetrations)

Containment airlocks are part of the EPP system however access doors i.e. bulkhead and civil penetrations are discussed on Section 3 and outlined in KWR-IP-CIV-024.

1.5 Monitoring Instrumentation (EAU-systems)

1.5.1 Pendulums

The Pendulums measures the relative horizontal displacement of the cylindrical walls. There are three pendulums fixed at three levels (+10.00 m, +26.00 m and +42.00 m level) at four points on the circumference of the containment (at 90°). The indicator or reading tables are rigidly fixed to the side of containment at the -6.70 m level, giving a measurement of the radial displacement of the cylindrical wall the various levels relative to the raft.

1.5.2 Invar Wires

The Invar Wires are connected to the Cylindrical Wall of containment at the +42.00m level. There are 4 invar wires which measure the vertical elongation of the containment structure relative to the base.

1.5.3 Stress and temperature measurements

Acoustic strain gauges are grouped in twos or threes and each group is associated with a thermocouple. This set is called a "measuring point". Such measuring points are located in the containment raft, wall and dome at positions on the interior, centre and exterior of the containment wall.

In the raft the directions of the acoustic strain gauges are horizontal, radial or tangential. In the cylinder two directions are used viz. vertical and horizontal tangential.

The tested sections are along two source lines (virtually at 90°).

1.5.4 Dynamometers

The tension existing in the four un-grouted cables on Unit 1 only are measured at the upper anchorage by three dynamometers of 150t load capacity each.

| COMPONENT | TRIGRAMME | DESCRIPTION |
|---------------|---------------------|--|
| Pendulums | x EAU 1 y z LZ* | Instrumentation measuring <u>horizontal</u> movement of the structure, at that location |
| Invar Wires | x EAU 2 y 1 LZ | Instrumentation measuring <u>vertical</u> elongation of the structure external wall |
| Strain Gauges | | Instrumentation installed to measure the <u>strain</u> the cylindrical containment wall |
| Thermocouples | | Instrumentation installed to measure the <u>temperature</u> the cylindrical containment wall |

* x = Unit; y = Station 1 – 4; Z =Location (1=top, 2=bottom, 3=middle)

Current indications are that the second order effects of creep and shrinkage of the concrete and the relaxation of the post tensioning cables have stabilized and no significant movement is expected in the future. This assumption was considered at length during LTO and verified through a Time-Limited Ageing Analysis.

1.6 Non-Structural or Non-License Binding components

1.6.1 Other components of the structure

Other components of the structure are classified as being either aesthetic or having conventional safety classifications. They are not load bearing, and complete loss of these components, would not impact on the structural performance nor be a breach of the operating license. The components are none-the-less still important for functionality and include:

- Reinforced Concrete Components
- Stairs on the dome
- Parapet wall
- Steel Components
- Hand Railings
- Lightning conductor
- Cat Ladders
- Supports to the pendulum and invar wire ducts
- Water Proofing

- Seals between the other nuclear island structures and containments
- Down Pipes for rain water run-off
- Sumps

1.7 Classification

The Classification for the Reactor Building Structures [1], [2] is as follows:

- Safety : **2**
- Seismic : **Category I**
- Quality : **Q2**
- Environmental : **NEV**
- Importance : **SR**

2 HISTORY/ BACKGROUND

The containment structures' design is based on the French design codes that considered various design loads. Since construction, the concrete has, however, been exposed to a harsh marine environment which led to corrosion of the external layer of reinforcement. The corrosion causes surface delamination to the external façade. This phenomenon was first identified in 2000 and repaired in 2002, which included the coating of the entire surface.

Further delamination was identified in 2014 and subsequently a complete repair initiative was performed which was completed in 2018. This included a complete refurbishment of the external façade and other minor superficial repairs such as the re-coating of the tendon heads and the sealing of the non-structural dome crack.

As part of the investigations into the delamination, several engineering analyses were performed, and it was concluded that the surface delamination has no impact on the structural integrity of the containment structures. Other events and interventions which occurred over the history of the structures' lifespan are provided in Table 2.

Table 2: History of major events & interventions on Containment

| DESCRIPTION | REFERENCE | YEAR |
|---|-----------|------|
| Average concrete casting date | | 1979 |
| Unit 2: De-lamination of Unit two containment building on 21/12. | GC 15099 | 2002 |
| 2 HRX 000 BG – Spalling of concrete from Unit 2 Containment building | NC 15184 | 2003 |
| Damage to supports under removable floor in Containment. | NC 15724 | 2003 |
| Defective Invar Wire Stations | NC 20842 | 2004 |
| Defective Invar Wire Stations | NC 20841 | 2004 |
| Extended period with abnormal containment pressurisation before existence of USQ on RRI thermal barrier isolation valves determined | GC 23779 | 2005 |
| Unit 1 Reactor Building 1 HRX 000 BG abnormal pressure increase rate. | NC 23057 | 2005 |
| Unit 2 Reactor Building, 2 HRX 000 BG, abnormal pressure increase rate. | NC 23615 | 2005 |

| DESCRIPTION | REFERENCE | YEAR |
|---|--|------|
| 2HRX000BG – INVAR WIRE P3 (Lose weight) – weight removed during CP1 modification | GC 28231 | 2006 |
| A chunk of concrete broke out of the North side Unit 2 containment wall | GC 31474 | 2007 |
| Concrete falling from containment wall due to poor workmanship by contractor previously. | GC 31202 | 2007 |
| 2HRX – Containment building Chloride Ingress leading to concrete spalling and potential loss of functionality. | NC 85076 | 2014 |
| Unit 2 Containment Building Concrete Spalling | NC 78294 | 2014 |
| 1HRX – Containment building chloride ingress leading to concrete spalling and potential loss of functionality. | NC 88731 | 2015 |
| TAF 15004 – 2HRX000BG- This TAF allows for the trial installation of a surface mounted Fibre Optic Sensor | GC 88347 | 2015 |
| EPR linked to non-conformance (NC 88731) is overdue. | CR 91627 | 2016 |
| Tendon Duct damaged during repair of 1 HRX (Patch 310) | CR 98139 | 2017 |
| Concrete Patch Repairs 2HRX completed | NC 78294 | 2017 |
| Concrete Patch Repairs 1HRX completed | N.KB00314.M.02 | 2018 |
| Delamination due to rebar corrosion in areas close to recently implemented repairs observed on both Unit 1 and Unit 2 | JN802-NSE-ESKB-IR-7884 & JN811-NSE-ESKB-L-8045 | 2019 |

As part of the license binding inspection programme (and other ad-hoc activities) the following inspections and tests have been performed:

Table 3: History of Inspection Programme

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|--|------------------|------|
| MONITORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES REV2 | WCGD/I 0240/18 | 1985 |
| KNPS CONTAINMENT 2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS | ACC2002490 | 1986 |
| KNPS STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST ON CONTAINMENT BUILDING 2 OUTAGE 201 | ACC2004513 | 1987 |
| KNPS UNIT-2 PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST OUTAGE 201 | ACC 1121811 | 1987 |
| KNPS UNIT-2 PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST OUTAGE 201 | MM 10818 | 1987 |
| STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST RESULTS CONTAINMENT UNIT 2,201, REPORT NO1 VOL A&B | K-7033-E | 1987 |
| e | K-6778-E | 1987 |
| KNPS UNIT-1 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS OUTAGE 102 | ACC 2005013 | 1988 |
| KNPS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS UNITS 1 & 2 | K-4234 | 1988 |
| KNPS UNIT-1 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS OUTAGE 102 | K-7017-E | 1988 |
| KNPS CONTAINMENT UNIT-2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST | K-3673 | 1988 |
| UNIT 1 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS - OUTAGE 102 | ACC1123450 | 1988 |
| KNPS CONTAINMENT UNIT-2 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST | K-4204 | 1988 |
| KNPS STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTING CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE UNIT-1 OUTAGE 102 | 16403056 | 1988 |
| KNPS CIVIL MONITORING PROGRAMME CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE INTEGRITY TESTS | MCS91059 | 1991 |
| KNPS NON-PRESSURISED CONTAINMENT TEST UNIT-2 | MCS91001 | 1991 |
| KNPS MONITORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF | HO4391005 | 1992 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|--|------------------|------|
| CONTAINMENT (OUTAGE 204) | | |
| KNPS MONITORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CONTAINMENT (OUTAGE 104) | HO4391001 | 1992 |
| MONITORING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE OUTAGE 104 | H043/91-001 | 1992 |
| KNPS MONITORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CONTAINMENT (OUTAGE 204) | K-9686-E | 1992 |
| CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY MONITORING | MCS92076 | 1992 |
| MONITORING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE OUTAGE 204 | H043/91-005 | 1992 |
| KNPS MONITORING THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF CONTAINMENT (OUTAGE 104) | K-9685-E | 1992 |
| STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTING UNIT 2 DEC 1994 | OL94076 | 1995 |
| SABS CERTIFICATE OF CALIBRATION NO. A170(B) | 815/87922/2 | 1996 |
| SABS CERTIFICATE OF CALIBRATION NO. A170(A) | 815/87922/1 | 1996 |
| VISUAL INSPECTION OUTAGE 210 2MBI027BG 2HRX000BGG | C304912 | 1999 |
| VISUAL INSPECTION CONTAINMENT LIGHTING MAST | P349891 | 2000 |
| e | C354683 | 2001 |
| VISUAL CONTAINMENT MONITORING | C354684 | 2001 |
| VISUAL CONTAINMENT MONITORING OUTAGE-112 | WK05587 | 2001 |
| VISUAL: MISCELLANEOUS INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE 112 | WK02696 | 2001 |
| VISUAL CONTAINMENT MONITORING | P399387 | 2002 |
| VISUAL CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 320944090 | 2003 |
| VISUAL: MISCELLANEOUS INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT MONITORING | 321108430 | 2003 |
| VISUAL: INVAR STATIONS INSPECTION REPORT | 320783907 | 2003 |
| VISUAL: MISCELLANEOUS INSPECTION REPORT | 320561624 | 2003 |
| VISUAL CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION | 320983034 | 2003 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|--|------------------|------|
| REPORT | | |
| INVAR STATIONS INSPECTION REPORT | 320666492 | 2003 |
| INVAR STATIONS INSPECTION REPORT | 320831740 | 2003 |
| DYNAMETER READING INSPECTION REPORT | 321667288 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT | 321276963 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT | 321276943 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981169 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981170 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981171 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981172 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CORROSION INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981168 | 2004 |
| VISUAL REACTOR BUILDING CIVIL INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981242 | 2004 |
| VISUAL CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE-114 | 320981241 | 2004 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321565461 | 2004 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321466222 | 2004 |
| e | 321733638 | 2004 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321570432 | 2004 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321570431 | 2004 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321303060 | 2004 |
| CIVIL CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321733639 | 2004 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321903040 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 321903039 | 2005 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|---|------------------|------|
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT OUTAGE 214 | 321497443 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096315 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096319 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096337 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096338 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096036 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322072431 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096306 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096330 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096334 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322414172 | 2005 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT | 322096344 | 2005 |
| LOAD CELL CALIBRATION CERTIFICATES | DE2006/041 | 2006 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING | 322748757 | 2006 |
| ONLINE CONTAINMENT MONITORING INSPECTION REPORT - CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY | 322917189 | 2006 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING | 322917188 | 2006 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING | 20060516 | 2006 |
| CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY - CONTAINMENT BUILDING UNIT 2 INSPECTION REPORT | 322080862 | 2006 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING UNIT 1 | 20060323 | 2006 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING UNIT 2 | 20060323 | 2006 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT | 323546717 | 2007 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT | 323045395 | 2007 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT | 323426558 | 2007 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT | 323254973 | 2007 |
| HRX CONTAINMENT UNIT-1 CIVIL STRUCTURE | 1HRX-1/2007 | 2007 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|---|----------------------|------|
| INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT 1HRX-1/2007 | | |
| HRX CONTAINMENT UNIT-1 CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT 1HRX-1/2007 | 323254973 | 2007 |
| 2HRX CONTAINMENT UNIT-2 CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT 2HRX-1/2007 | 2HRX-1/2007 | 2007 |
| 2HRX CONTAINMENT UNIT-2 CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT 2HRX-1/2007 | 323254851 | 2007 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT 1HRX | 323727410 | 2007 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT 2HRX | 323781302 | 2007 |
| CIVIL INSPECTION INTERNAL STRUCTURE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT | 323121848 | 2007 |
| OUTAGE 116 - ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURED TEMPERATURE DISTRIBUTION IN THE REACTOR PIT | JN094-NSE-EK-L-526 | 2007 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION CONTAINMENT UNIT2 OUTAGE 216 | JN098-NSE-EK-R-1144 | 2008 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 | JN192-NSE-EK-IR-2444 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 | JN192-NSE-EK-IR-2443 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING OUTAGE 217 | JN192-NSE-EK-IR-2445 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING EXTERNAL | JN192-NSE-EK-IR-2406 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT BUILDING EXTERNAL | JN177-NSE-EK-IR-2364 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT BUILDING OUTAGE 117 | JN177-NSE-EK-IR-2221 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 | JN205-NSE-EK-IR-2558 | 2009 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 | JN205-NSE-EK-IR-2559 | 2009 |
| MEASUREMENT OF LEVELS OF GREASE IN SLEEVE OF UNGROUTED TENDONS | JN234-NSE-EK-L-2893 | 2010 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|---|------------------------|------|
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 | JN233-NSE-EK-IR-3037 | 2010 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 | JN233-NSE-EK-IR-3036 | 2010 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT TRENDING OF CONTAINMENT MONITORING DATA 2010 | JN247-NSE-EK-R-3644 | 2011 |
| REPLACEMENT OF VERTICAL INVAR WIRE AT KNPS | JN308-NSE-ESKB-R-4117 | 2011 |
| CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY | JN391-4496 | 2012 |
| UNIT 1 AND 2 CONTAINMENT ONLINE MONITORING TRENDING REPORT - 2012 | JN382-NSE-ESKB-R-4369 | 2013 |
| CONCRETE REPAIRS OF EXTERNAL SURFACES TO THE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS PHASE ONE QCP | JN420-NSE-EKSB-L-5153 | 2013 |
| CONDITIONAL RELEASE EVALUATION FOR NC 78294 DEGRADATION OF UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE 40M LEVEL DUE TO CORROSION OF THE EXTERNAL OUTERMOST LAYER OF REINFORCEMENT IN THE CONCRETE REV.3 | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2014 |
| KNPS DETERIORATION OF THE COVER CONCRETE OF CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS REV.3 | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2014 |
| KNPS CONDITIONAL RELEASE EVALUATION FOR NC- 78294 REV.0 | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2014 |
| KNPS CONDITIONAL RELEASE EVALUATION FOR NC- 78294 REV.1 | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2014 |
| KNPS CONDITIONAL RELEASE EVALUATION FOR NC- 78294 REV.2 | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2014 |
| KNPS ENGINEERING PROBLEM REPORT E13-0041 NC- 78294 REV.0 | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2014 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 6 FEB 14 CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 6 FEB 14 | JN439-NSE-ESKB-L-5142 | 2014 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 OUTAGE 220 INTERNAL | JN439-NSE-ESKB-IR-5144 | 2014 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING OUTAGE 220 EXTERNAL | JN439-NSE-ESKB-IR-5145 | 2014 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|--|------------------------------|------|
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMERY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 2 28MAY2014 CONTAINMENT UNIT 1 28MAY2014 | JN454-NSE-ESKB-L-5272 | 2014 |
| CONTAINMENT ONLINE MONITORING & TRENDING REPORT FOR UNIT 1&2 | JN458-NSE-ESKB-L-5616 | 2014 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT ON LINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN456-NSE-ESKB-IR-5447 REV.1 | 2014 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT BUILDING OUTAGE 220 | JN439-NSE-ESKB-IR-5144 | 2014 |
| KOEBERG NUCLEAR POWER STATION - IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR ALKALI-SILICA REACTION CONCRETE DEGRADATION AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (INCLUDES ASR TEST REPORT FOR KNPS) | JN411-NSE-ESKB-L-6049 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT UNIT-2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING OUTAGE 221 | JN585-NSE-ESKB-IR-6106 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT ONLINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN585-NSE-ESKB-R-6105 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT ONLINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN585-NSE-ESKB-L-6105 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT ONLINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN637-NSE-ESKB-R-6289 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT ONLINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN637-NSE-ESKB-L-6289 | 2015 |
| DETERIORATION OF THE COVER CONCRETE OF CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS AT KNPS | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT ON LINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN583 NSE-ESKB-IR-5907 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) OUTAGE 121 | JN511-NSE-ESKB-IR-5739 REV.1 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT BUILDING (INTERNAL) OUTAGE 121 | JN511-NSE-ESKB-IR-5738 REV.1 | 2015 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|--|-----------------------------|------|
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION REPORT CONTAINMENT BUILDING ONLINE MONITORING UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN511-NSE-ESKB-L-5737 | 2015 |
| SYSTEM DESIGN ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNIT-1 ILRT OUTAGE-121 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS RESULTS | JN411-NSE-ESK-L-6081 REV.0 | 2015 |
| SYSTEM DESIGN ENGINEERING ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNIT-1 ILRT OUTAGE-121 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS RESULTS | JN411-NSE-ESK-L-6235 REV.0 | 2015 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION ASSESSMENT OF CONTAINMENT MONITORING TRENDING AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS | JN391-NSE-ESKB-L-6585 | 2016 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT-1 OUTAGE-122 EXTERNAL INSPECTION | JN713-NSE-ESKB-IR-6702 | 2016 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT-1 OUTAGE-122 EXTERNAL INSPECTION | JN319-NSE-ESKB-L-6793 | 2016 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT UNIT 1/2 MONITORING RESULTS | JN-713-NSE-ESKB-L-6701 | 2016 |
| RE-ASSESSMENT OF EDF REPORT ON OUTAGE 221 ILRT | JN411-NSE-ESKB-L-6427 REV.1 | 2016 |
| SYSTEM DESIGN ENGINEERING ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNIT-2 ILRT OUTAGE 221 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS RESULTS | JN411-NSE-ESKB-L-6427 REV.1 | 2016 |
| SYSTEM DESIGN ENGINEERING ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNIT-2 ILRT OUTAGE 221 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS RESULTS | JN411-NSE-ESKB-L-6426 REV.0 | 2016 |
| SYSTEM DESIGN ENGINEERING ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNIT-2 ILRT OUTAGE 221 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS RESULTS | JN411-NSE-ESK-L-6386 REV.0 | 2016 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING RESULTS FIRST QUARTER TRENDING AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS | JN664-NSE-ESKB-R-6366 | 2016 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING RESULTS FIRST QUARTER TRENDING AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS | JN664-NSE-ESKB-L-6366 REV.1 | 2016 |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING RESULTS SECOND QUARTER TRENDING AND INTERPRETATION OF | JN695-NSE-ESKB-AP-6561 | 2016 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|---|------------------------|------|
| RESULTS | | |
| CONTAINMENT MONITORING RESULTS SECOND QUARTER TRENDING AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS | JN695-NSE-ESKB-L-6561 | 2016 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING SURFACE DEFECTS NUMERICAL ANALYSIS | JN411-NSE-ESKB-R-5830 | 2016 |
| DETERIORATION OF THE COVER CONCRETE OF CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS | JN426-NSE-ESKB-4988 | 2016 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT MONITORING RESULTS 4TH QUARTER 2016 UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN723-NSE-ESKB-L-6756 | 2016 |
| CIVIL STRUCTURE INSPECTION SUMMARY REPORT CONTAINMENT MONITORING RESULTS 1ST QUARTER 2017 UNIT-1 AND UNIT-2 | JN729-NSE-ESKB-L-6819 | 2016 |
| HRX 1 ST QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN-729-NSE-ESKB-L-6819 | 2017 |
| HRX 2 ND QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN-729-NSE-ESKB-L-7102 | 2017 |
| HRX 3 RD QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN-729-NSE-ESKB-L-7017 | 2017 |
| HRX 4 TH QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN-729-NSE-ESKB-L-7188 | 2017 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 2 | JN778-NSE-ESKB-IR-7588 | 2018 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 1 | JN811-NSE-ESKB-IR-8045 | 2019 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 2 | JN834-NSE-ESKB-IR-8258 | 2020 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 1 | JN851-NSE-ESKB-IR-8398 | 2021 |
| TENDON INSPECTION | LI 38811-001 LI-009 GA | 2022 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 2 | JN868-NSE-ESKB-IR-8760 | 2022 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 1 | JN876-NSE-ESKB-IR-881 | 2022 |
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (INTERNAL) UNIT 2(OUTAGE 225) | JN868-NSE-ESKB-IR-8759 | 2022 |
| HRX 1ST QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN875-NSE-ESKB-L-8785 | 2022 |
| HRX 2ND QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN881-NSE-ESKB-L-8931 | 2022 |
| HRX 3RD QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN888-NSE-ESKB-L-8950 | 2022 |
| HRX 4TH QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN897-NSE-ESKB-L-9026 | 2022 |

| Document Description | Reference Number | Year |
|--|-------------------------|-------------|
| CONTAINMENT BUILDING (EXTERNAL) UNIT 1(OUTAGE 126) | JN899-NSE-ESKB-IR-9086 | 2022 |
| HRX 1ST QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN902-NSE-ESKB-L-9148 | 2023 |
| HRX 2ND QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN907-NSE-ESKB-L-9230 | 2023 |
| HRX 3RD QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN910-NSE-ESKB-L-9314 | 2023 |
| HRX 4TH QTR 2017 CONTAINMENT MONITORING | JN917-NSE-ESKB-L-9428 | 2023 |

3 KNOWN OR POTENTIAL THREATS

This section refers to the 'threats' to the structural integrity of the containment buildings (i.e., the third barrier). These threats have the potential to challenge the design base or the operation of the structures.

3.1 Known Threats

There are multiple possible failure mechanisms which can impact the performance of safety-related concrete structures, in accordance with IAEA Nuclear Energy Series: No. NP-T-3.5, *Ageing Management of Concrete Structures in Nuclear Power Plants*, which were considered below:

| COMPONENT | TYPE OF FAILURE | DEGRADATION MECHANISMS | TEST/EVALUATION |
|---|----------------------|---|--|
| Cylindrical walls | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cracking Chloride Induced Corrosion (of External Facades) Coating degradation | Planned civil visual inspection and concrete non-destructive testing |
| Domes | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cracking Chloride Induced Corrosion (of External Facades) Coating degradation | Planned civil visual inspection and concrete non-destructive testing |
| Internal concrete structures (walls, slabs, beams, columns, floors, plinths, anchor plates) | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cracking Spalling Leaching Corrosion of reinforcing steel Coating degradation Irradiation | Planned civil visual inspection |
| Internal steel structures (floors, beams, columns, baseplates, stairs) | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Corrosion Cracked and broken welds Loose connections Deformation of sections Loss of protective coating | Planned civil visual inspection |

| COMPONENT | TYPE OF FAILURE | DEGRADATION MECHANISMS | TEST/EVALUATION |
|--|----------------------|--|--|
| Post Tensioning systems and Tendon grease | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corrosion • Elevated temperature • Irradiation • Fatigue • Loss of tensioning force • Hydrogen Embrittlement risk generated by ICCP | Hydrogen embrittlement linked to ICCP was considered in TRS [4] and to be taken into account as part of the design and subsequent installation, which will become available as the ICCP project progresses. Furthermore, CR 109937-008 GA has been raised to compile Ageing Management programme for Containment ICCP which will be procured as part of TRS [4]. |
| Pre-stressing tendon anchoring end caps (located on the dome and upper raft) | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corrosion | Planned civil visual inspection |
| Online monitoring equipment | Functionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weathering on ducts/wires • Corrosion on brackets supporting invar wires/pendulums pipes. | Planned civil visual inspection |
| Bulked head doors/Access doors | Functionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corrosion • Water tightness due to wear of locks, hinges and closure mechanisms and cracking due to irradiation. | Planned Civil inspection |
| Containment penetrations | Functionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aging effects of mortars and grouts due to elevated temperatures and irradiation | Planned civil inspection |
| Waterproofing/joints | Functionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cracking • General wear and vibration fatigue • Ageing of polymers | Planned civil inspection |

| COMPONENT | TYPE OF FAILURE | DEGRADATION MECHANISMS | TEST/EVALUATION |
|--------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------------------|
| Gutters/Downpipes | Functionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corroded brackets • Missing down pipes | Planned civil inspection |
| Ladders/Stairs platforms | Functionality | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corrosion | Planned civil inspection |
| Polar crane rail | Structural integrity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corrosion on the corbels supporting the polar crane rail • Loose connections | Planned civil inspection |

Eskom is aware of various chemical degradation mechanisms which could affect reinforced concrete. These failure mechanisms were eliminated as threats (as discussed in an NEPP) and the most detrimental degradation mechanism at the station have shown to be Chloride Ingress (Chemical Threat) related degradation.

The history of delamination on the containment structures is discussed in § 2 while the plan for future works are discussed in § 1.1.

4 MONITORING AND TRENDING

4.1 Inspection Regime

The inspection regime of KNPS is governed by KNPS ISI PRM Manual 240-119362012 which include Module E-L (ASME Section XI, “American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Division 1, Rules for the In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components”, 2007 Edition with Addenda up to and including 2008 [7] as part of the 4th In-Service Inspections interval). The regime is conducted in accordance with KAU-030. The inspection frequencies are stipulated in Table 4.

Table 4: Component Inspection frequency

| Component/Section | Frequency | Procedure |
|--|-----------|---|
| HRX – External Note: Tendon end caps in the Vault are inspected as part of KWR-IP-CIV-014 | 1RO | KAU-030, 240-119362012 (Module E-L) KWR-IP-CIV-005 |
| HRX – Internal | 2RO | KAU-030, 240-119362012 (Module E-L) KWR-IP-CIV-024 |
| Dynamometer | Quarterly | KAU-030 - KWR-IP-CIV-015 |
| Invar Wires & Pendulums | Quarterly | KAU-030 - KWR-IP-CIV-017 & KWR-IP-CIV-018 |
| Strain Gauges and Thermocouples | Quarterly | KAU-030 - KWR-IP-CIV-016 |
| Topographical Survey (Upper & Lower Rafts) | 5 Yearly | KAU-030- KWR-IP-CIV-023 |
| ILRT | 10 Yearly | KBA 0028 NES MA CLR 003 & KGU-042 |

The inspection regime referred to above identifies any degradation on the containment structures inclusive of degradation of minor components (handrails, downpipes, cat ladders, etc.) and structural components (concrete, tendon heads, etc.). The inspections form part of the basis of the ageing management programme of the structures.

4.2 Preventative Maintenance

Regular implementation of the remedial actions /maintenance repairs identified through the civil surveillances are intended to serve as a preventative maintenance strategy. This includes for example the coating of the tendon heads although the corrosion identified was only superficial, and the sealing of the cracks on the domes which are non-structural and does not impact the integrity of the structures.

It is noted that there have been delays to repair concrete degradation (as identified through the surveillances) resulting in large patches amounting to approximately 11% of the containment building surface area being delaminated and chloride ingress extending past the rebar cover depth. If left unattended, corrosion of the post tensioning ducts can be expected in the future. It is important to note that the surface repairs have no impact on structural integrity.

The resultant maintenance repairs have grown into large-scale refurbishment works to be conducted on an ad-hoc required basis as part of the maintenance projects. Refer to Appendix 9.1 for more maintenance and modification information until end-of-life 2045 + 10 years for decommissioning.

4.3 Structural Integrity

The current status of the containment structures can be summarized as follows (with more information in the subsequent sections):

- The Structures' integrity is not compromised, and the tendons remain intact.
- The Dynamometers have recently been re-calibrated.
- The on-line monitoring equipment require refurbishments.
- There is extensive delamination on the structures' external facades, although the delamination has been shown to have a negligible effect on the structures' robustness.
- There are several degraded minor components. This includes the downpipes, handrails, cat ladders, etc.

Accordingly, the degraded condition of the structures are tracked under the CURA Risk (R027141). The Risk is level II, with a Consequence Level 6 (highest), and likelihood level B.

4.3.1 Concrete Repairs

Extensive patch repairs were completed in 2018 on unit 1 and 2 containment buildings. This was conducted as part of a project under an Equivalency [21]. The repairs included all the delamination identified at the time on both cylindrical walls and domes. Additional work was included as preventative maintenance including coating of sections, re-coating of steel components and the sealing of the dome cracks. The repairs are non-structural and only about 11% of the structures' surfaces have been rehabilitated.

4.3.2 Delamination

The trend from the inspection reports notes that the delamination on the containment buildings are increasing and will continue to increase. This is due to the continual ingress of chlorides on the containment structures. These inspection reports also noted that areas around the patch repairs on the containment buildings induce further delamination. Thus patch repairs to the structures are not sustainable. This can be attributed to the phenomena where the anode (part of the structure which corrodes) 'moves' next to where the anode used to be, i.e. the area which the patch repair is applied to. The areas adjacent to the patched areas will now corrode at an accelerated rate.

Thus, an expert panel [10] was appointed by Eskom which looked at long-term permanent solutions. The recommendation of the long-term solution is discussed under § 5.3.

4.3.3 Anomalies

As part of the design, the structure has a significant variability in the thickness in concrete where the cylindrical dome joins the thick ring beam, and then reduces to the dome. This has caused cracking along the circumference of the dome, in the form of a continuous $\pm 110\text{m}$ crack.

As part of the 10 yearly ILRT testing these cracks were measured and monitored as part of the ILRT tests to determine the significance of the cracks. It was shown that the cracks are not influenced by the increase in pressure and are only influenced by environmental temperatures, i.e., the cracks are non-structural and are not impacted by internal mechanical stresses. The cracks were sealed as part of N.KB00314.M.02 (Civil Recovery project) (referred to in § 4.3.1).

4.4 Time-Limiting Aging Analysis

Extension of the operational lifespan of the containment unit 1 and 2 is in progress. A comprehensive evaluation detailed **Error! Reference source not found.** was completed. This report analysed time-dependant (ageing) parameters linked to the containment buildings structural integrity and demonstrated that the containment building can safely continue operating for the period 60 years.

Furthermore KNPS embarked on a Safety Aspects Long Term Operation (SALTO) mission. The findings for the containment unit 1 and 2 are stated below:

4.4.1 Functionality of the monitoring system

The functionality of the monitoring system regarding the number and distribution of operating measurement devices and the quality of device signals was confirmed through SALTO. The project however makes the following recommendations, with status comments:

- install additional strain gauges fixed to the exterior surface of both domes (planned as part of the ILRT)
- recalibrate the load cell or exchange it (re-calibration completed),
- perform the outstanding repair of the 4 erratic pendulums in Unit 1 (planned for August 2024)
- install additional temperature gauges to improve the temperature (planned as part of Mod 23002)

4.4.2 Inspections and Repair regime

The inspection program and recommended repair regime are sufficient to ensure the structural integrity of the post tensioned containment structures of unit 1 and unit 2. It was recommended to extend the containment surface repairs considerably in the following period of LTO in order to ensure the structural integrity of the containment structures of unit 1 and 2 if the ICCP is not pursued.

This is in line with the allowance for periodical repairs of the Containment Buildings' facades. Additionally, the inspection reports' recommendations shall be followed.

Concrete repairs shall be initiated if a depth of concrete loss of 60 mm is detected, or if delamination is identified on a surface area of 100 m². However, if uncovered reinforcement bars are detected by inspection, the concrete repair must be performed immediately and independent from depth of concrete loss and relating surface area. **N.B:** there is currently no uncovered reinforcement bars.

4.5 EAU System

For the containment structures, monitoring and trending is performed using the Online Monitoring system (trigramme EAU). The monitoring is licence binding in accordance with the Nuclear Installation License NIL-01 and KAU-030 [12]. Other procedures for how the measurements are conducted for the different instrumentation are captured in references [15] – [18].

The trending is done quarterly, and currently there are no concerns associated with the results of the on-line monitoring. It is however noted that some devices provide erratic readings due to degradation of the monitoring devices themselves which has no impact on the structures' integrity. To this extent the dynamometers was recently re-calibrated as recommended.

A project to refurbish the Pendulums and Invar Wires on Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings at Koeberg Operating Unit is currently in the procurement process, with implementation planned to begin in March 2024 to solve the erratic behaviour of the on-line monitoring devices. This is similar to works performed during 2005-2006 (see § 5.1).

4.6 Intergrated Leak Rate Test

The intergradted leak test (ILRT) in accordance with KNPS ISI PRM 240-119362012 (ASME XI, IWL-5000) requires that the ILRT be conducted on containment structure unit 1 and 2 to test the linearity of the structures under accident pressure the testing is scheduled on a 10 yearly basis with the last undertaken in 2015 yeilding successful results. The next ILRT is planned for the X27 outage cycle, aligning with the scheduled testing intervals.

4.7 Impressed Current Cathodic Protection

The installation of Impressed Current Cathodic Protection (ICCP) system on both HRX structures (Modification 16002), is planned for implementation in November 2024. The design of the ICCP system is done by an external specialist consultant with reviews and acceptance by Eskom. Furthermore, it has been submitted to the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) for review. A mock-up of the ICCP system was constructed at KNPS as part of the verification and validation of its compatibility with the containment structure and as an additional measure to verify the use of ICCP.

Considering that the ICCP installation will start in November 2024, all the delamination that has been identified up to now, and will further develop before the commissioning of the ICCP, will be repaired

as part of the ICCP installation project which is planned to run over the next 3 to 4 years.

The existing delamination does not compromise structural integrity and the timing of the repairs will ensure that the ICCP is installed on a sound substrate with no delamination which may compromise the functionality of the ICCP.

ICCP is planned for installation during 2024. Furthermore, other key dates for the ICCP project is noted below:

| Phase | Pre-Project. | | Concept Phase | | Definition Phase | | | Execution Phase | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|------------------------|------------------|----------------------|-----------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| | PLCM Del. Mil | SOW-AU | CRA | FS-CO | DRA | TRS-CO | ERA | DC-CPA-CO | DDA-CO | IH-DD-CO | ICC-CO | SC-KORC-AP | DNS-CO | NIL-AU | MOS-CO | IMPL | |
| Project | MILESTONES | T-48 | T-46 | T-39 | T-38 | T-33 | T-32 | T-23 | T-19 | T-14 | T-14 | T-13 | T-10 | T-9 | T-5 | T-3 | T-0 |
| | | SOW-AU | CRA | Feasibility Study (FS) | DRA | Tech Req. Spec (TRS) | ERA | D/Design Contract | Scheme Design Accepted | D/Design Approval | Inhouse Design | Install. Contract | S/Case KORC | NNR Submission | D/D & S/C NNR AU. | Material on Site | Construct / Impl. Start |
| ICCP 16002 | PLANNED | 01-Nov-20 | 01-Jan-21 | 01-Aug-21 | 01-Sep-21 | 01-Feb-22 | 01-Mar-22 | 01-Dec-22 | 01-Dec-22 | 01-Sep-23 | 01-Sep-23 | 01-Oct-23 | 01-Jan-24 | 01-Feb-24 | 01-Jun-24 | 01-Aug-24 | 01-Nov-24 |
| | ACTUAL | 23-Aug-16 | N/A | 31-Mar-17 | N/A | 22-Jun-18 | 20-Mar-20 | 07-Feb-21 | | | | | | | | | |
| | Aspirations | | | | | | | | 01-Sep-21 | 01-May-22 | #N/A | 01-Sep-22 | 01-Jan-23 | 01-Feb-23 | 30-May-23 | 31-Aug-23 | 01-Jul-23 |

5 MODIFICATIONS

5.1 Modification(s) Completed

| Modification Number | Description | Comment |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|
| | Coating of Containment Structures | Completed in 2002 |
| | Concrete Repairs 1 & 2 HRX | 2002-2003 |
| | Invar wire replacements | 2005-2006 |
| EMERGENCY BUY | Concrete Patch Repairs 2HRX | Completed in 2017 |
| N.KB00314.M.02 | Concrete Patch Repairs 1HRX | Completed in 2018 |

5.2 Cancelled Modification(s)

N/A

5.3 Modification(s) in Progress and Future Modification(s)

The following modification(s) are currently planned for installation within the next ten years:

| Mod # | Description | Comment |
|-------|--|--|
| 16002 | ICCP | Design of ICCP has been accepted by Eskom and is currently under NNR review for acceptance |
| 23002 | Modification for online instrumentation for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 | Modifications for the Containment Online Monitoring Equipment in progress. |

6 LIFE CYCLE PLAN AND EXPENDITURE

The life cycle plan and expenditure for planned and future modifications on the containment structures appear below. The objective is to plan for a 60-year plant life i.e. until 2045 plus 10 years decommissioning.

| YEAR | COST (R) | CAPITAL/ R&E | REASON | IDENTIFICATION |
|-----------|----------|--------------|--|----------------|
| 2023 | 350K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2023 | 40M | R&E | Concrete repairs/Waterproofing/ Coatings/Online monitoring equipment, maintenance replacement | Refurbishment |
| 2023-2025 | 140M | Capital | ICCP on 1&2 HRX (Design/Mock-up/Implementation) | Mod:N.GN16002 |
| 2022 | 350K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2023 | 350K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2023 | 50M | R&E | ILRT (ISIPRM 240-119362012) 1&2 HRX | Monitoring |
| 2024 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2025 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2026 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2027 | 45M | R&E | Concrete repairs/Waterproofing/ Coatings/Online monitoring equipment maintenance replacement/ICCP maintenance | Refurbishment |
| 2027 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 | Monitoring |

| YEAR | COST (R) | CAPITAL/ R&E | REASON | IDENTIFICATION |
|------|----------|--------------|--|----------------|
| | | | (including online & ICCP monitoring) | |
| 2028 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2029 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2030 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2031 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2032 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2033 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2033 | 45M | R7E | Concrete repairs/Waterproofing/ Coatings/Online monitoring equipment maintenance replacement/ICCP maintenance | Refurbishment |
| 2033 | 50M | R&E | ILRT (ISIPRM 240-119362012) 1&2 HRX | Monitoring |
| 2034 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2035 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2036 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2037 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2038 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |

| YEAR | COST (R) | CAPITAL/ R&E | REASON | IDENTIFICATION |
|------|----------|--------------|--|----------------|
| 2039 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2039 | 45M | R&E | Concrete repairs/Waterproofing/ Coatings/Online monitoring equipment maintenance replacement/ICCP maintenance | Refurbishment |
| 2040 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2041 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2042 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2043 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2043 | 50M | R&E | ILRT (ISIPRM 240-119362012) 1&2 HRX | Monitoring |
| 2044 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2045 | 45M | R&E | Concrete repairs/Waterproofing/ Coatings/Online monitoring equipment maintenance replacement/ICCP maintenance | Refurbishment |
| 2045 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2046 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2047 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2048 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 | Monitoring |

| YEAR | COST (R) | CAPITAL/ R&E | REASON | IDENTIFICATION |
|------|----------|--------------|--|----------------|
| | | | (including online & ICCP monitoring) | |
| 2049 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2050 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2051 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2051 | 45M | R&E | Concrete repairs/Waterproofing/ Coatings/Online monitoring equipment replacement/ICCP maintenance | Refurbishment |
| 2052 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2053 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2053 | 50M | R&E | ILRT (ISIPRM 240-119362012) 1&2 HRX | Monitoring |
| 2054 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |
| 2055 | 400K | R&E | Inspection as per KAU-030 (including online & ICCP monitoring) | Monitoring |

* Values excludes CPI

** Assumes a 5 yearly Civil Recovery Project and 10 yearly ILRT.

*** The current setup for civil recovery project is covered under R&E maintenance budget from KOU.

7 CONCLUSION

The containment structures remain compliant and sufficient against design base loads and the ageing management programme is being implemented as required by the statutory requirements. Engineering analysis confirms that the structures are not compromised by surface delamination. In fact, the Time-Limited Ageing Analysis has indicated that the structures will remain compliant to design requirements for an additional 20-years.

The main structural threat for the buildings is chloride induced corrosion. Without a permanent intervention the delamination on the structures will continue until they are degraded thus needing to be decommissioned. Therefore the implementation of ICCP is necessary so as to protect the post-tensioning cables from degradation ensuring structural integrity for long term operation.

The monitoring trending reports shows concerns regarding failures of the monitoring devices and thus loss of baseline measurements, thus provision shall be made for 5yearly replacement of Invar and Pendulum wires, including strain gauge, thermocouple augmentation/replacement, and calibrations of all these monitoring equipment to ensure availability until 2045 with an additional 10years for decommissioning. This is based on operational experience and failure rates and subsequent loss of monitoring baselines currently experienced.

The containment and its sub-categories as mentioned in preceding sections form part of comprehensive role in the containment integrity. Thus, necessitating periodic inspections and maintenance.

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9 APPENDICES

10.1 MAINTENANCE REQUIRED AND NOTIFICATIONS

10.2 JUSTIFICATION

9.1 Maintenance Required and Notifications

| | Component | Condition | Planned Rehabilitation | Notification/Project |
|---|---------------------|-----------|--|----------------------|
| Main Structural Components | Base Mat | None | - | |
| | Gusset | None | - | |
| | Cylindrical Wall | Extreme | ICCP Required to ensure continuous operation of KNPS | Mod 16002 |
| | Ring Beam | Urgent | ICCP required to protect embedded tendon heads | Mod 16002 |
| | Dome | Extreme | ICCP Required to ensure continuous operation of KNPS | Mod 16002 |
| Internal Structures | Concrete Structures | None | - | |
| | Missile Shields | None | - | |
| | Steel Structures | None | - | |
| On-line Monitoring | Invar Wires | Long Term | Continuous monitoring of condition - no mitigation in-place and failure is anticipated | CE 17339 |
| | Strain Gauges | None | Failure is occurring, however no rehabilitation or modification planned | CE 17339 |
| | Thermocouples | Long Term | Failure is occurring, however a rehabilitation or modification is planned | CE 17339 |
| | Dynamometers | Urgent | Calibration of the dynamometers- | CE 17339 |
| Non-Structural and Non-Licence Binding Components | Other Components | Urgent | Non-structural elements of the structure in poor condition, maintenance required | |
| | Water Proofing | Long Term | - | |
| | Down Pipes | Urgent | A design is in place for the repair, implementation required | |
| | Sumps | None | - | |

9.2 Justification

Revision 0

1. First Compilation

Revision 1

2. Update of new projects, strategy and defects.

Revision 2

3. Update to include SALTO mission gaps.

Revision 3

4. Annual Revision with minor updates